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UNCITRAL Working Group III
on ISDS Reform:
How Cross-Cutting Issues
Reshape Reform Options1

15 July 2019

1

This document was submitted, with the title Reshaping the Reform Agenda: Concerns Identified and Cross-Cutting Issues
to UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform in accordance with paragraph 83 of document A/CN.9/970 (Report of
Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its 37th session (New York, 1–5 April 2019)).
That paragraph, and the discussion it reflects, invited submissions by states and other stakeholders on reform options to
inform UNCITRAL’s efforts in identifying and prioritizing particular solutions UNCITRAL will develop in the next phase
of its work. The submission was prepared by Lorenzo Cotula (IIED), Thierry Berger (IIED), Lise Johnson (CCSI), Brooke
Güven (CCSI) and Jesse Coleman (CCSI).

1. At its 36th session (Vienna, 29 October–2 November 2018), UNCITRAL Working Group III on
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Reform (WGIII) identified three broad categories of
concern for which ISDS reform was deemed desirable:
• Concerns relating to the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability and ‘correctness’ of
arbitral decisions;2
• Concerns relating to arbitrators and decision makers;3 and
• Concerns relating to costs and duration of ISDS cases.4

2. In addition, at its 37th session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), WGIII concluded that reform was
desirable in order to address concerns related to the definition and the use or regulation of thirdparty funding in ISDS.5 At its 37th session, WGIII also engaged in a discussion to identify
possible additional concerns not already addressed in its deliberations. WGIII discussed the
following issues:
• Means other than arbitration to resolve investment disputes as well as dispute prevention
methods;6
• Exhaustion of local remedies;7
• Implications for third parties, and the role of third-party participation, including
participation both by the general public and by local communities affected by the
investment or the dispute at hand;8
• Investor obligations and counterclaims;9
• Regulatory chill;10 and
• Damages.11

3. WGIII noted that these issues related to:12
• Concerns that had already been identified (e.g., third-party participation, which WGIII

•

partly linked to concerns about the consistency and correctness of arbitral decisions,13 and
damages, which WGIII linked, “for example,” to concerns about correctness of arbitral
decisions14);
Tools to be considered by WGIII in Phase 3 of its mandate (e.g., means other than

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ‘Report of Working Group III
(Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session (Vienna, 29 October–2
November 2018)’ (hereafter UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’). Concerns include: 1) divergent interpretations
of substantive standards, divergent interpretations relating to jurisdiction and admissibility and procedural
inconsistency (para. 39); 2) lack of a framework to address multiple proceedings (para. 53); and 3) limitations in
the current mechanisms to address inconsistency and incorrectness of arbitral decisions (para. 63).
3
Including: 1) lack or apparent lack of independence and impartiality (UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1)
para. 83); 2) limitations in existing challenge mechanisms (para. 90); 3) lack of diversity of decision makers
(para. 98); and 4) qualifications of decision makers (para. 106).
4
Including: 1) lengthy and costly ISDS proceedings and the lack of a mechanism to address frivolous or
unmeritorious cases (UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) paras. 122 and 123); 2) allocation of costs in
ISDS (para. 127); and 3) concerns regarding the availability of security for cost in ISDS (para. 133).
5
UNCITRAL, ‘Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its
Thirty-Seventh Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019)’ (hereinafter UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’), para. 25.
6
ibid para. 29.
7
ibid para. 30.
8
ibid paras. 31–33.
9
ibid paras. 34–35.
10
ibid paras. 36–37.
11
ibid para. 38.
12
ibid para. 39.
13
ibid para. 33; see also UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) paras 59, 61.
14 UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 5) para. 38.
2
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•

arbitration to resolve investment disputes as well as dispute prevention methods;15
exhaustion of local remedies16); and
“Guiding principles for developing reforms” (e.g., addressing regulatory chill, including
with regards to the “inherent asymmetric nature of the ISDS system, costs associated with
the ISDS proceedings, and high amounts of damages awarded by tribunals”;17 not
foreclosing “consideration of the possibility that claims might be brought against an investor
where there was a legal basis for doing so”18).

4. Based on these observations, WGIII resolved to consider the issues listed in paragraph 2 above as
part of its exploration of possible reforms to address the concerns that have been identified (rather
than as additional concerns at the current stage).19 In effect, WGIII framed these aspects as crosscutting issues to be considered in Phase 3 of its mandate.

5. WGIII reiterated that this conclusion “did not preclude other concerns to be identified and dealt

with at a later stage of the deliberations.”20 It also noted that any work by WGIII would need to
take into account developments in investment treaties, so that the solutions developed by WGIII
are flexible enough to adapt to a rapidly changing international policy context.21

6. To support WGIII in the implementation of this approach, Table 1 illustrates how consideration
of the cross-cutting issues affects the contours of the concerns WGIII has identified and of
possible options for reform. Separate submissions to WGIII discuss in greater detail: implications
for third parties and issues concerning third-party participation;22 regulation of third-party funding
(and draft text to accomplish this objective);23 and a multilateral framework on termination and
withdrawal of consent, which illustrates how the UNCITRAL process could be used to provide
space for other means of dispute settlement.24

7. The issues identified in Table 1 are relevant to WGIII’s discussion of reform options, including
those identified as more structural in nature, those that can be applied to the current ad hoc ISDS
system or those that straddle these lines. As illustrated in Table 1, considering the cross-cutting
issues will help ensure that, as WGIII proceeds to the next phase of its reform discussions, it
broadly surveys the range of potential options and takes a holistic view of their implications. In
practice, it would mean that:
• The cross-cutting issues are fully integrated in WGIII’s work and reflected in its project
schedule(s);
• WGIII sessions devoted to reform options for the concerns identified further consider how
the cross-cutting issues affect the concern at stake and related reform options;
• WGIII periodically revisits whether developments in its deliberations warrant additional
concerns to be specifically identified and addressed;
15

ibid para. 29.
ibid para. 30.
17
ibid paras. 36–37.
18
ibid para. 35.
19
ibid para. 39.
20
ibid
21
ibid para. 40.
22
CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Third Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform
(Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019).’
23
CCSI, IISD and IIED, ‘Draft Text Providing for Transparency and Prohibiting Certain Forms of Third-Party
Funding in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019).’
24
CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Draft Treaty Language: Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and Termination of
International Investment Agreements (Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019).’
16
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•

The cross-cutting issues are duly considered in any activities organized in connection with
the work of WGIII, such as seminars, colloquia or online discussions that are formally or
informally linked to WGIII;
WGIII and the UNCITRAL Secretariat are endowed with adequate resources to consider the
cross-cutting issues and their implications for reform options, including development of any
technical analysis necessary to support WGIII’s deliberations.

4

Table 1. Cross-cutting issues: Illustrative implications for Phase 3 of WGIII’s mandate
Concerns identified →
Cross-cutting issues ↓

Means other than
arbitration to resolve
investment disputes as
well as dispute
prevention methods

Concerns pertaining to the
lack of consistency, coherence,
predictability and correctness
of arbitral decisions

Concerns pertaining
to arbitrators and
decision makers

Concerns pertaining to cost and
duration of ISDS cases

Concerns pertaining to
third-party funding

Consider alternatives to ISDS, such as domestic courts, ombudsmen, alternative dispute resolution and state-to state dispute
settlement
Consider limits on the causes of action that can be pursued through ISDS (e.g., to denial of justice)
Consider rules on referral to other courts and/or expert bodies and on staying ISDS disputes while related proceedings are
pending that might narrow or resolve issues relevant to the ISDS claim or defence

Exhaustion of domestic
remedies

Consider requiring exhaustion as
a means of clarifying and
crystallizing the scope of legal
and factual issues for resolution
at the international level,
potentially reducing scope for
inconsistent or incorrect
decisions

Consider requiring
exhaustion for all or
some causes of action
to more clearly
allocate primary
responsibility for
deciding different
issues of law and fact
between different
domestic and
international
adjudicators, each with
different sociocultural
backgrounds, areas of
expertise and powers
of review

Consider the effect on duration of
ISDS proceedings and duration of
overall proceedings from initiation
of claim through post-award
challenges

Consider the effect of
exhaustion on the nature
and availability of thirdparty funding of claims

Implications for third
parties25

Consider participation by actors
specifically affected by the
investment or the dispute,
beyond amicus curiae
submissions, in order to promote
correct interpretation and
application of all relevant norms

Consider ways to
ensure decision
makers have expertise
in key relevant areas
of law, including
outside of investment
law and in issues
raised by community–
investor disputes

Consider arrangements to ensure
that enhanced third-party
participation does not unduly
increase cost or duration26

Consider whether/how
disclosure or other rules
regarding third-party
funding would govern
participation by and/or
funding of third parties

Consider dismissal or reframing
of claims where affected third
parties cannot be joined, so as to
prevent inconsistent and
incorrect interpretations of their
rights

Consider processes for
referral to other courts
and/or expert bodies
and stays of
proceedings pending
resolution of third
parties’ rights

25

Consider rules on dismissal where
impacts on affected third parties
give rise to risks of multiple
proceedings
Consider how addressing issues
relating to third parties may affect
overall cost and duration,
including by avoiding or
consolidating claims

Further discussion of implications for the rights of third parties is in the separate submission CCSI, IIED and
IISD, ‘Third Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform’ (n 23).
26
This may involve, for example, case management rules including strict deadlines and limiting size of party
and third-party submissions. However, WGIII emphasized that “ensuring due and fair process as well as
guaranteeing the quality and correctness of the outcomes should not be sacrificed for the sake of speedy
resolution of ISDS” (UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) para. 117).
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Concerns identified →
Cross-cutting issues ↓

Counterclaims

Concerns pertaining to the
lack of consistency, coherence,
predictability and correctness
of arbitral decisions

Concerns pertaining
to arbitrators and
decision makers

Concerns pertaining to cost and
duration of ISDS cases

Concerns pertaining to
third- party funding

Consider providing greater
clarity regarding issues on which
arbitral jurisprudence is divided
(e.g., nature of the required
connection between claim and
counterclaim)

Consider ways to
ensure decision
makers have expertise
in key relevant areas
of law, including
investor legal
compliance issues

Consider arrangements to ensure
that counterclaims do not unduly
increase cost or duration27

Consider whether/how
disclosure or other rules
regarding third-party
funding would govern
state receipt of funding in
the context of
counterclaims

Consider how use of
counterclaims can address issues
of inconsistency across
otherwise separate proceedings
Consider how to ensure
consistency and coherence
across legal regimes, including
by allocating decision-making
authority across those regimes
Regulatory chill

Consider processes for
referral to other courts
and/or expert bodies
and stays of
proceedings for
resolution of
counterclaims

Weigh costs and benefits of
permitting counterclaims with
costs and benefits of requiring
those claims to be pursued in
different fora

Consider removing or restricting access to ISDS through, e.g.:
-

Requiring exhaustion of local remedies

-

Limiting some or all causes of action or issues to state-to-state dispute resolution28

-

Including state-to-state filters that claims must pass through before going to ISDS

Consider arrangements to
increase consistency and
predictability (e.g., an appeal
mechanism), in order to mitigate
regulatory chill concerns
Consider providing greater
clarity regarding rules for
dismissing frivolous claims and
related costs

Consider clarifying
rules on deference to
factual and legal
determinations and
policy preferences of
domestic (or other)
government bodies or
adjudicators

Consider issues concerning
calculation of damages, as well as
legal and arbitration costs, in order
to reduce the incentive to sue for
monetary damages, reduce the
overall financial cost of ISDS and
mitigate its impact on public
decision making

Consider transparency of
third-party funding and
funding arrangements in
order to understand the
role of third-party funding
in ISDS and its impact on
certain categories of
claims

Consider making “costs follow the
event” the default rule

Consider whether to
prohibit funding or
otherwise limit the types
of claims that can be
funded29

Consider requiring security for
costs
Consider sanctions against counsel
for frivolous or abusive claims
Consider strengthened pleading
standards

27

Commentary in the previous footnote applies mutatis mutandis.
This could draw on the approach used in the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement. A
convention could be used whereby states could substitute state-to-state dispute settlement for ISDS for some or
all causes of action, for some or all treaties. A discussion of how this could be done is in the separate submission
CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Draft Treaty Language: Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and Termination of
International Investment Agreements’ (n 25).
29
See separate submission CCSI, IISD and IIED, ‘Draft Text Providing for Transparency and Prohibiting
Certain Forms of Third-Party Funding in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (n 23).
28
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Concerns identified →
Cross-cutting issues ↓

Calculation of damages

Concerns pertaining to the
lack of consistency, coherence,
predictability and correctness
of arbitral decisions

Concerns pertaining
to arbitrators and
decision makers

Concerns pertaining to cost and
duration of ISDS cases

Concerns pertaining to
third-party funding

Consider arrangements to
increase consistency and
predictability as regards the
burdens of proof and the legal
standards for assessing damages

Expand availability of
review for errors of
fact and law in
damages assessments

Consider clarifying the evidence
required and the methods used for
the calculation of damages, so as
to reduce the overall financial cost
of ISDS

Consider clarifying the
evidence required and the
methods used for the
calculation of damages, as
well as legal and
arbitration costs

Consider increasing consistency
with norms regarding damages
assessments in other relevant
areas of law and policy

Consider rules on early disclosure
of nature of damages claims and
support for those claims

Consider caps on the
amount or percent of
damages and/or interest a
Consider clarifying rules on cost
third-party funder may
shifting, interest and recoverability
recover (to the extent such
funding is permitted)
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